Reactors and Leverage: How Russia and China Built a Nuclear Sphere of Influence
And Why It’s Not Just About Clean Energy
Earlier this year, I was invited to speak on a Korean radio program about South Korea’s nuclear export ambitions—especially their bid to construct new reactors in the Czech Republic. The interview was upbeat: the APR-1400 had proven itself at Barakah in the UAE providing 25% of country’s electricity, and Korea’s nuclear industry had earned a rare global reputation for building on time and budget (or close to), and without a trail of lawsuits.
After the interview, someone asked an interesting question:
“If our technology is so good, why are countries still choosing Russian or Chinese reactors?”
It’s a fair question—and one that exposes the real mechanics of energy diplomacy.
While the West debates permitting reform and drowns in white papers, Russia and China are exporting not just reactors, but strategic entanglement. Their nuclear programs are designed not merely to decarbonize or provide a stable baseload power, but to embed influence, extract compliance, and shape policy for decades.
And here’s the twist: these projects do help fight climate change. But they also entrench authoritarian leverage in the very infrastructure we claim will power a “cleaner, freer” future.
How Did We Get Here? A Short History of Nuclear Export Dominance
In the Cold War era, the U.S. and the Soviet Union dominated global nuclear deployment. But by the 1990s:
Western interest dried up.
Domestic buildouts stalled post-Chernobyl and post-TMI (note the big dip in the reactors under construction in the figure below after these two events).
Public and political support cratered.
Meanwhile, Russia quietly converted its Soviet legacy into a global reactor business, and China industrialized fast enough to catch up (check out the post-Fukushima rise for both of these countries). Both states saw what Western policymakers didn’t: that nuclear energy isn’t just a technology—it’s a 60-year geopolitical asset. Note on the figure above: the convergence to zero around 2030 simply means we are only projecting the constructions current as of 2025—those that are happening now and will finish by then. This is NOT to imply that there will not be new constructions, on the contrary.
Where Are They Building Now?
Let’s look at the actual projects under construction—not MOUs, not lobbying, but real concrete and steel.
🇷🇺 Rosatom (Russia) is building 20 nuclear reactors in 6 countries (excluding Russia):
Turkey: Akkuyu, 4 × VVER-1200 with the first unit nearly complete (2025); Rosatom owns the plant.
Egypt: El Dabaa, 4× VVER-1200. Directly from the World Nuclear News: “Under the 2017 contracts, Rosatom will not only build the plant, but will also supply Russian nuclear fuel for its entire life cycle. It will also assist Egyptian partners in training personnel and plant maintenance for the first 10 years of its operation. Rosatom is also contracted to build a special storage facility and supply containers for storing used nuclear fuel. Construction of the nuclear power plant began in July 2022.”
Bangladesh: Rooppur, 2 × VVER-1200, Unit 1 nearing commissioning. Fuel is being provided by Russia. Spent fuel will be sent back to Russia.
Iran: Bushehr II, VVER-1000, expansion in progress—in 2024, Iran signed agreement with Russia for two more units in Bushehr. Even thought commissioning of the second unit was expected in 2026, it is not clear if this will be delayed. Interesting twist to response of uranium enrichment accusations—Iran recently announced that it contracted Russia to build eight (yes, EIGHT) more reactors, including four at Bushehr, significantly expanding their partnership. Is this PR or real? Who knows…
India: Kudankulam 3–6, VVER-1000, Units 3 & 4 in advanced build phase. Units 5 & 6 are in the initial stages of construction.
Hungary: Paks II, 2× VVER-1200. Revived after political delays—sanctions on Russian nuclear construction were imposed in 2024, but lifted in June 2025.
All of these projects:
Lock in Russian fuel contracts.
Rely on Russian-trained personnel.
In many cases, include waste return to Russia—ensuring long-term dependency.
🇨🇳 CNNC/CGN (China)
China’s overseas projects are fewer—but each one is deeply bundled with Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) loans, infrastructure integration, and political alignment. Domestically, as of today, China has 29 reactors under construction—close to half of all reactor constructions around the world. China is expected to surpass France in nuclear power generation shortly. In addition, China is the world’s leader in construction of new generation reactors.
Here are the recent abroad efforts by China:
Pakistan: Karachi 2 & 3, Hualong One, Operational since 2021 (Unit 2) and 2024 (Unit 3). In addition, China began to build Chashma unit 5, another Hualong One type reactor, at Mianwali in Punjab, in 2024.
SIDEBAR: Barakah vs. Akkuyu — Two Export Models, Two Futures
I started with mentioning South Korea and their international efforts. KEPCO / KHNP (Korean agencies building nuclear projects) have been trying to position themselves as a competition with global French and US based companies while providing alternatives to Russian dominance. Let’s compare the two recent projects—similar in scope and magnitude—by Russia in Akkuyu, Turkey (project described above) and South Korea in Barakah, UAE:
Footnote 1: the ownership is in fact 100% Russian, as of today. However, Turkey is projecting a possibility of taking over the ownership in the future (up to 49% can be purchased from Russia under their original agreement).
So, clearly Barakah was a partnership. Akkuyu is a leased dependency. One empowers the host nation. The other preserves the exporter’s leverage. Turkey is reserving the right to revolt and started exploring other suppliers of components including China.
Clean Energy, Dirty Leverage
Yes—both Russia and China are expanding access to carbon-free power. But they’re doing it with strings attached.
🇷🇺 Russia:
VVERs are decades-old designs. They are still solid (and even have some of the passive safety features), but not cutting-edge.
Fuel supply remains tied to Russia’s conversion and enrichment capacity (still ~38% and 46% of global capacity).
Waste take-back sounds generous—until the host country has no back-end strategy of its own.
Rosatom acts as a foreign policy instrument, not a commercial company.
🇨🇳 China:
Hualong One is functionally a remix of Western tech—not fully indigenous.
Fuel cycle services are still underdeveloped, no waste solutions offered.
Projects are often embedded with BRI infrastructure and surveillance technology.
Beijing doesn’t offer “support”—it offers alignment.
These are not just energy projects. They’re long-term political anchors.
🧠 How to Compete—Before It’s Too Late
Produce HALEU (High Assay Low Enriched Uranium—the fuel needed by the advanced reactors in the US and abroad—Russia is currently holding the near-monopoly in the world) at scale. Centrus, a US company, recently reported a breakthrough and delivered 900 kilograms of HALEU to the Department of Energy for various projects.
Create a U.S. Nuclear Export Authority—DOE alone can’t do it.
Bundle: SMRs + hydrogen + desal + training + digital twins. The reactors need to be designed with a purpose while being practical. Not because someone is really passionate about a particular coolant or feature.
Push allied consortia (e.g., Korea + U.S. offering SMR hybrids).
Treat nuclear diplomacy as energy statecraft—not an afterthought.
Reactors Are Not Just Infrastructure
I say this repeatedly on this substack. They’re strategic alignment mechanisms. They determine:
Who controls your energy input.
Who trains your workforce.
Whose standards your regulators use.
And who you can’t afford to offend in a diplomatic standoff.
Russia and China understand this. The question is: do we?
🖤 If this piece hit a nerve, share it. If you think I missed the mark, send fuel cycle diagrams or uranium chunks.